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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
sound,"0 it's conclusions appear to be based on an inarticulated assumption.
To wit, that a rate of $9.23 on a weekly salary of $13.85 is unwarranted
for an employee who is only partially disabled. Under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law, a rate of $9.23 on a weekly salary of $13.85 would be warranted
for a partially disabled employee if the disability were not only "partial in
character but permanent in quality." 57 The distinction between a temporary
and permanent partial disability is not made by the Court.
There is even some indication that the partial disability was permanent.
That is, the Board Panel, which discharged the Special Fund, stated that the
medical evidence in the record showed that there was a continuing partial
disability.58 If the partial disability was only temporary in character, the
established rate of $9.23 was not warranted and the decision to discharge
the Special Fund appears sound. However, it further appears that the Court
should have fully defined the partial disability so as to give judicial support to
their decision.
ZONING
VALIDITY OF CONDITIONED ZONING AMENDMENT
In Church v. Town of Islip' an action was brought for a declaratory judg-
ment, voiding the rezoning of the defendant's property in the Town of Islip
from Residence A to Business, and for injunctive relief. The Supreme Court2
rendered judgment declaring the rezoning amendment invalid and unconstitu-
tional, which decision was reversed by the Appellate Division.3 The Court of
Appeals held that this legislative zoning change granted upon condition that
the owner of the property execute certain restrictive covenants as to maximum
area occupied by the building located thereon and certain other restrictions was
valid and constitutional and not subject to attack on any theory that the re-
zoning constituted contract zoning or spot zoning.
While stability and regularity are undoubtedly essential to the operation
of zoning plans, zoning is by no means static. Changed or changing conditions,
as experienced by the town in question, call for revised plans. A person who
owns property in a particular zone or use district enjoys no eternally vested
right to that classification if the public interest demands otherwise. 4
The Court here is asked to decide whether the Town of Islip validly
56. The statute requires the Board to spread the lump sum settlement at the rate
applicable to the disability found at the time of the approval of the lump sum settlement
by the Referee.
57. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 15(3).
58. Supra note 48.
1. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
2. 6 Misc. 2d 810, 160 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
3. 8 A.D.2d 962, 190 N.Y.S.2d 927 (2d Dep't 1959).
4. Rodger v. Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E,2d 731 (1951).
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effected such a change, in view of the attack by plaintiffs that among other
things this zoning amendment was "spot zoning." Spot zoning may be defined
as the process of singling out a small parcel of land for a use classification
totally different from that of the surrounding area for the benefit of the owners
of such property and to the detriment of other owners., This type of zoning is
the very antithesis of planned zoning, the latter requiring a comprehensive plan
in its application. However if an ordinance is enacted with a comprehensive
plan in mind, it is not necessarily "spot zoning," even though it singles out
and affects one small plot,5 or creates, in the center of a large zone, small areas
or districts devoted to a different use. 6 The relevant inquiry is not whether
the particular zoning under attack consists of areas fixed within larger areas of
different uses, but whether it was accomplished for the benefit of individual
owners rather than pursuant to a comprehensive plan for the general welfare
of the community.
Since neither the appellant or the respondent in this action questions the
Appellate Division's findings that the change (from Residence A to Business)
is conditioned upon the executing and recording of a deed subjecting the land to
certain restrictions, these findings of fact are conclusive. The majority in its
opinion states that "Since the town Board could have presumably zoned the
property without restrictions we fail to see how reasonable conditions invalidate
the legislation."7 These conditions in addition to being classified as reasonable
are held by the Court to be beneficial to the community by respondent's neigh-
bors. It should be noted however, that the very objection to the second im-
portant issue in this case i.e. "zoning by contract," is really to the condition
itself. Whether the conditions are good or bad, reasonable or unreasonable,
is immaterial. The question of illegality is based solely on the municipality's
power, not policy. The late Mr. Basset, who was this country's leading authority
on zoning, denounced the sale of zoning legislation twenty years ago in the
following words: "Sometimes local legislatures state that they will make certain
zoning changes if property owners file agreements either with one another or
with the city. This is wrong, unnecessary and unfair. There is no consideration
for such a bargain because the municipality cannot receive a consideration for
taking steps in legislation."8  Other prominent text writers are in accord.
In Schwab v. Graves,'( this Court held that the Town Board in granting a
permit and in imposing terms and conditions for the exercise of a right, was
not acting in a private capacity but acting under its police power. The town's
sole power was to regulate through its police power, a power which is not sub-
5. Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 731 (1951).
6. Nappi v. La Guardin, 295 N.Y. 652, 64 N.E.2d 711 (1945).
7. Supra note 1 at 259, 203 N.Y.S.2d 869 (1960).
8. Bassett, Zoning 184 (1940).
9. Rathkopp, The Law of Zoning and Planning 392 (3d ed. 1956); Metzenbaum,
The Law of Zoning 789 (2d ed. 1955).
10. 221 App. Div. 357, 223 N.Y. Supp. 160 (4th Dep't 1927).
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ject to limitation by private contract. In Bartholmew v. Village of Endicott,"
the Court held that the exercise of any legislative power by a village for public
benefit cannot be limited by contract and any attempt to do so would con-
stitute an illegal act.
Section 262 of the Town Law authorizes the Town Board to create dis-
tricts subject to the condition, among others, that, "All such regulations (within
a district) shall be uniform for each class or kind of building, throughout such
district." The Town Board, although it has the power to set up different use
districts, must treat all property within the zone uniformally. When, however,
the Board, as in this case, resorts to individual covenants and restrictions with
the property owners in question, the Board in effect is destroying the scheme
of uniformity required by the statute. It would seem that the property in-
volved in this case takes on a characteristic of a "zone within a zone," with
its own requirements over and above those applicable to Business Zone proper-
ties in general. This point is strongly urged by the dissenters, although it
went unmentioned by the majority of the Court.
Population increases and economic changes are posing difficult problems
to local legislative bodies in regard to zoning changes. This is a real problem
and a solution should be reached. Whether or not the more appropriate remedy
would be to grant variances is not in issue here. While the Court is anxious to
affect a satisfactory solution to a pressing problem, it seems questionable to
disregard the means used to achieve that end.
MILK VENDING MACIINE IN APARTMENT HOUSE
A VALID SUBSIDLRY USE
In Dellwood Dairy Co. v. City of New Rockelle,12 the Court of Appeals
reversed the Appellate Division'3 and sustained the trial court decision. The
sole issue the case presented was whether the presence of a coin-operated milk
vending machine, installed in the basement of an apartment building located in
a restricted residential zone, violated the Zoning Law of the City of New
Rochelle. These laws prohibit any business in the R-5 District except "Accessory
uses customarily incident to the above uses" (the above use in this case is an
apartment house). An "accessory use" is defined as "a use customarily inci-
dental and subordinate to the main use conducted on the lot, whether such
accessory use is to be conducted in a main or "accessory building.' 4 The
Court of Appeals held that there was no violation. It found that the use of
a milk vending machine is but a different method of doing a traditional service
for a householder. Little, if any, adverse effect to the character of the resi-
dential neighborhood can result from the presence of the machine. It's not the
11. - Misc. -, 59 N.Y.S2d (Sup. Ct. 1945).
12. 7 N.Y.2d 374, 197 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1960).
13. 7 A.D.2d 1026, 184 N.Y.S.2d 656 (2d Dep't 1959).
14. New Rochelle Zoning Law Art. VII, § 1(e).
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